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The Need for Consistency in
Pennsylvania Divorce Proceedings:
Recognition of Increased Earning
Potential as an Asset in Career Threshold
Divorces.
I. Introduction
She who waits for the knight in shining armor must clean up
after his horse.'
For the nondegreed spouse in a career threshold divorce2 in
Pennsylvania, Camelot has definitely come to an end. Although the
Divorce Code of 19808 effected wholesale changes in many facets of
Pennsylvania matrimonial law," it failed to address the problems
1. TIME, Jan. 1, 1979 at 64.
2. A "career threshold" divorce, often referred to as the student-spouse syndrome, fol-
lows quickly on the heels of the attainment of an educational degree or license. Typically, one
spouse has obtained a degree or license which was substantially financed through the contribu-
tions of the other spouse. The spouses in the text will be referred to as student and nonstudent
or degreed and supporting. For purposes of consistency in pronoun usage, the student spouse
will be assumed to be male and the nonstudent spouse female. The parties then separated prior
to their receiving any of the benefits normally resulting from a professional degree or license.
An inequitable factor adversely affecting the economic status of the supporting spouse is that
her deficiencies in earning power are largely attributable to sacrifices made in support of her
husband's education. The student spouse leaves the marriage with an enhanced earning capac-
ity which he achieved, at least partly, through the nonstudent spouse's contributions; yet pres-
ently in Pennsylvania the nonstudent exspouse can never share in the rewards. Moreover, little
or no tangible assets are usually available for equitable distribution. Both courts and commen-
tators recognize the frequency of marriages that break up shortly after the student spouse
receives a degree. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 78
(1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting) ("[lthe case presents the not unfamiliar pattern of the wife,
willing to sacrifice for a more secure family financial future, works [sic] to educate her hus-
band only to be awarded a divorce decree shortly after he is awarded the degrees'); Erickson,
Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals: How the Law Can Ensure
Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 947, 948 n.4 ("'Putting hubby through' college, law school,
medical school or other educational program (getting a Ph.T as it is sometimes called), ap-
pears to be a firmly entrenched American tradition, despite the women's liberation move-
ment"). See generally Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Pro-
tection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980) (discussing
the economic problems of recompensating the nonstudent spouse in the, typical career threshold
divorce suit).
3. Divorce Code, Act No. 1980-26, §§ 101-802, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 49 (Purdon)
[hereinafter cited as Divorce Code or Code]. The new Code became effective in Pennsylvania
on July 1, 1980. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 802 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84).
4. See generally Gold-Bikin & Rounick, The New Pennsylvania Divorce Code, 25 VILL.
faced by working spouses who contribute to their marital partners'
education, but are rewarded with a divorce shortly after the gradua-
tion of the student spouse. The Pennsylvania appellate courts have
not yet ruled on the issue and the lower courts seem too captivated
by rhetorically clothed caveats to fashion an appropriate remedy.
Despite the legislatively infused dynamism in the new Pennsylvania
Divorce Code then, the tragic scenario of career threshold divorces
continues to warrant legislative or judicial response.
II. Background
Traditional social, legal and political norms have entrenched nu-
merous inequities in American society for the married woman. For
example, though common law property concepts considered a mar-
ried couple to be an indivisible unit, a married woman had no right
of action against her spouse, since the two were legally one person,
and that person was the husband.' Moreover, because a marriage
was viewed as insoluble, the only form of divorce available at com-
mon law was a "divorce a mensa et thoro" which did not destroy
the marital bond. Property division, therefore, is a relatively recent
innovation, bottomed on a theory of joint contribution to the marital
enterprise.7
For purposes of comparison, states usually divide into three cat-
egories according to the rights of the parties to share in property
acquired during the marriage: community property,8 strict common
law9 or equitable distribution. 0 The principal premise of a commu-
L. REV. 617 (1980).
5. See I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, §§ 598, 599 (Jones
ed. 1915); Lexcen, The Equal Rights Amendment, 31 FED. B.J. 247 (1972).
6. A "divorce a mensa et thoro" was a divorce from bed and board and is similar to the
contemporary separation. See J. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 420 (1968).
7. See generally Note, The Implied Partnership: Equitable Alternative to Contempo-
rary Methods of Post Marital Property Distribution, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 221 (1974).
8. Eight states can be termed "community property" states: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
25-211 (1976); CAL. CIv. CODE § 5104 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 32"906 (Supp. 1982);
LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 2335 (West Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1979); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8B (1978); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 501(b) (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1982).
9. Three states are strict common law states where property is awarded on the basis of
title alone. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law Co-
op 1976); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-16 (1980).
10. The remaining thirty-nine states can be termed "equitable distribution" states: ALA.
CODE § 30-4-19 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 09-55-210(6) (1975 & Supp. 1982); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (1973 & Supp. 1982);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81(a) (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513(a) (1974);
FLA. STAT. § 71.14 (1975 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 30-105 (1967 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 580-47(a) (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982); IND. CODE § 31-3-11.5-11(b) (West 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(d) (Supp. 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(1) (Baldwin
Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 7221-IA(i) (1981); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 1 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, §34 (West Supp. 1982-1983); MICH. COMP.
nity property system is that both spouses contribute equally to the
marital venture." Consequently, an equal co-ownership of property
inheres in each spouse pursuant to the view of the marital institution
as a joint undertaking.' 2
In contrast, strict common law states divide property solely on
the basis of the name or names on the legal title. Prior to the new
Divorce Code, Pennsylvania adhered to strict common law princi-
ples, awarding property only according to legal title." In fact, Penn-
sylvania's divorce laws had remained virtually unchanged since
1785.1" For example, Pennsylvania was the only state, as of 1980,
which permitted neither alimony nor post dissolution distribution of
marital property. 15 The equitable distribution provisions of the new
Divorce Code, however, gave the non-titled spouse an inchoate inter-
est in all of the marital property until divorce,' 6 at which time a
court could make some reasonable and just division through the em-
ployment of a variety of factors.'
LAWS ANN. § 552.23(1) (Supp. 1982-1983); MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 452-330.1 (Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 48-321(1) (Supp. 1977); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-
34-23 (West Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50.20 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1982-1983); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.105(1)(c) (1981-1982); PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-23, § 23-401(d) (Purdon Supp.
1983-84); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1982); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-825 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15 § 751 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 20-107.3 (Supp. 1983); WIS. STAT. § 767.255
(1981-82); WYO. STAT. § 20-2-114 (1977).
11. See generally W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROP-
ERTY (2d ed. 1971).
12. In practice, only three community property states - California, Louisiana and New
Mexico - divide the property equally in all cases. The other five - Arizona, Idaho, Nevada,
Texas and Washington - divide the community property equitably. See Freed & Foster, Di-
vorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1981).
13. Morrissey, A Pennsylvania Primer for Alimony and Equitable Distribution, 47 PA.
B.A.Q. 503, 511 & n.45 (1978).
14. See Teitelbaum, The Pennsylvania Divorce Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, Commen-
tary at 343-60 (Purdon 1955).
15. Gold-Bikin & Rounick, The New Pennsylvania Divorce Code, 25 VILL L. REV. 617
(1980).
16. Where a spouse fails to assert a claim of equitable distribution in the divorce pro-
ceeding, however, that cause of action is considered waived by both parties. See, e.g. Ciotti v.
Ciotti, 40 Bucks 324 (Pa. C.P. 1983) (claim for equitable distribution must be raised in con-
junction with a divorce or else that claim will not be preserved by the final decree entered in
the divorce action).
17. The relevant factors are listed in PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 403(d) (Purdon
Supp. 1983-1984) as follows:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, em-
ployability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning power
of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions or capital assets and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medical, retire-
ment, insurance or other benefits.
When commencing an equitable distribution proceeding a court
must identify the marital property. Section 401(c) of the Pennsylva-
nia Divorce Code defines marital property as "all property acquired
by either party during the marriage '" with certain exceptions. 19
Thus, the statute may require additional judicial definition since the
word "property" is left open to interpretation. After the marital
property is properly identified the second task is to value these
assets.
Finally, the court must reasonably and fairly distribute the mar-
ital property to both parties. 2 The 1980 Divorce Code granted
courts broad discretion to "equitably divide, distribute or assign the
marital property between the parties without regard to marital mis-
conduct in such proportions as the court deems just after considering
all relevant factors."2 " This broad grant of authority has withstood
constitutional attack despite its application to property acquired
prior to the effective date of the Code. 8 A new challenge is presently
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, deprecia-
tion or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as
homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to
become effective.
For an exhaustive analysis of each of these ten factors, see J. ROUNICK, PA. MATRIMONIAL
PRACTICE §§ 18:12 - 18:28 (1983).
18. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
19. The exceptions include:
(1) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage except for
the increase in value during the marriage;
(2) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties entered into before, during or
after the marriage;
(3) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent except for the increase in value
during the marriage;
(4) Property acquired after separation until the date of divorce, provided however, if the
parties separate and reconcile, all property acquired subsequent to the final separation until
their divorce;
(5) Property which a party has sold, granted, conveyed or otherwise disposed of in good
faith and for value prior to the time proceedings for the divorce are commenced;
(6) Veteran's benefits exempt from attachment, levy or seizure pursuant to the act of
September 2, 1958, Public Law 85-857, 72 Statute 1229, as amended, except for those benefits
received by a veteran where such veteran has waived a portion of his military retirement pay
in order to receive Veteran's Compensation; and
(7) Property to the extent to which such property has been mortgaged or otherwise en-
cumbered in good faith for value, prior to the time proceedings for the divorce are commenced.
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
For an in-depth discussion of each of these exceptions, see J. ROUNICK, PA. MATRIMO-
NIAL PRACTICE §§ 18:33 - 18:43 (1983).
20. This seems consistent with the notion of equitable distribution as a flexible concept.
Flexibility, however, must always be subordinate to consistency in divorce proceedings. The
virtue of consistency in the law is axiomatic. See infra notes 46-75 and accompanying text.
21. See Gee v. Gee, - Pa. Super. -. , 460 A.2d 358 (1983) (trial judge has wide
discretion to fashion equitable distribution remedy in each case according to exigencies of
specific situation).
22. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
23. Bachetta v. Bachetta, 498 Pa. 227, 445 A.2d 1194 (1982),
surfacing however. Because courts now recognize both financial and
nonfinancial contributions as contributing to the economic viability
of the marital unit, the original three-step24 approach to equitable
distribution has developed a hitch: equitable compensation of the
nonstudent spouse in a career threshold divorce if no assets exist.
This comment, then, will analyze the traditional arguments
against one remedy that has been suggested as a possible answer to
the unfairness of career threshold divorces: recognizing the increased
earning capacity of the student spouse as a marital asset subject to
distribution. Further, the existing alternatives to recognizing such an
asset will be explored. Finally, this comment will offer some alterna-
tive suggestions for redressing the injustices of the student-spouse
syndrome."'
III. Need for Consistency in Equitable Distribution Theory
Numerous studies have indicated that income levels relate di-
rectly to educational levels.2 Often this educational attainment is
the product of a concerted family investment of both time and
money.27 Typically, one spouse has relinquished the immediate en-
joyment of her own earned income to enable the student spouse"8 to
pursue an advanced degree on a full time basis. Because the income
of the nonstudent spouse is used for family maintenance expenses,
usually little accumulated marital property 29 is available for distri-
bution when the marriage dissolves prior to attainment of the ad-
vanced education and expected financial gains. Thus, the equities
weigh heavily in favor of providing a remedy8 to the nonstudent
spouse in a career threshold divorce.
24. See text accompanying supra notes 18-21.
25. See infra notes 177-90 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Brunner & Wayland, Education and Income, 32 J. EDUC. & Soc. 21
(1958); Glick and Miller, Educational Level and Potential Income, 21 AM. Soc. REV. 307
(1956); King, Divorce Settlements: The Value of Human Capital, 18 TRIAL 48 (1982); Sch-
ultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POLITICAL ECON. 571 (1960); Comment, The
Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 590 (1974).
27. See, e.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983)
(former husband's law degree, which was the end product of a concerted family effort, held to
be marital property).
28. See supra note 2.
29. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
30. Courts in other jurisdictions have considered the issue of a working spouse's entitle-
ment to relief incident to a dissolution where that spouse supported the marriage during the
years of the student spouse's education. The jurisdictions which have allowed recovery to the
nonstudent spouse have based their rulings on divergent remedies. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (student spouse's capacity for increased earnings is
a marital asset subject to equitable distribution); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App.
1979) (professional degree constitutes marital property); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747
(Oki. 1979) (nonstudent spouse has an equitable claim for her past investment). For an inten-
sive analysis of the Hubbard decision, see Note, Divorce - The Effect of a Spouse's Profes-
sional Degree on a Division of Marital Property and Award of Alimony, 15 TuLSA L. J. 378
(1979).
The equitable distribution sections of the new Code, 1 pro-
foundly changed the standards governing the inclusion and division
of property and infused flexibility rather than rigidity"2 in the mea-
surement of the rights and duties of each spouse upon dissolution of
the family unit. Traditionally static concepts of property bow to the
more dynamic goal of effectuating economic justice between the di-
vorced parties and insuring "a fair and just determination and settle-
ment of their property rights."83 This legislatively injected flexibility
tracks with a more pervasive judicial determination to achieve equi-
table results in dissolution proceedings. Recently, customary notions
of property have undergone marked changes. 4 For example, the
courts of Pennsylvania and other jurisdictions have treated goodwill
in a business or profession, 85 pension benefits, s6 closely-held corpora-
tions,87 and homemaker's services83 as property subject to equitable
distribution. The need for consistency in property division theory and
the desire to achieve equitable results could also dictate the recogni-
tion of a new asset in divorce suits: increased earning capacity. 9
Though no Pennsylvania appellate court has decided whether to
consider increased earning capacity an asset subject to equitable dis-
tribution, the majority of Pennsylvania trial courts have responded
negatively.4°
31. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 §§ 401-404 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
32. Judge Spaeth stated this point succintly: "[TIhe essence of the approach of an equi-
table distribution is that 'after considering all relevant factors' the Court may deem Uust] a
division that awards one of the parties more than half, perhaps the lion's share of the prop-
erty." Platek v. Platek, - Pa. Super. -, -, 454 A.2d 1059, 1063 (1982).
33. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 102(a)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
34. An analogous theoretical progression can be seen in the area of law pertaining to the
assignability of future contract rights. Previously, such assignments were considered void be-
cause they attempted to assign something that was not property. See, e.g., 4 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 874 (1951). Presently, however, future rights are assignable if they arise out of an
existing or continuing employment or relationship. Assignment of rights under a contract not
yet in existence operates only as a promise to assign when the rights arise. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 321(2).
This limitation on assignment of future contract rights is imposed "not because of any
logical necessity, but by virtue of a public policy which seeks to protect the assignor and third
parties against transfers which may be improvident or fraudulent." Id., comment (b) at 29.
See also 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 413 (3d ed. 1960). Consequently, to the degree that
treatment of future earning potential as a property right involves the assignment of future
contract rights, the concerns of the Restatement do not apply. The only applicable public pol-
icy is Pennsylvania's interest in equitable dissolutions of marital property.
35. See infra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
39. The increased earning capacity that results from an investment in education has
been likened to the return on an investment in stock. See King, Divorce Settlements: The
Value of Human Capital, 18 TRIAL 48 (1982). "The analogy between the purchase of an
education and the purchase of stock should be apparent. Implicit outlays of cash are made in
both instances, and if the investment is sound, the investor will receive returns that exceed the
amount invested." Id. at 49.
40. See e.g., Pratt v. Pratt, 68 Lancaster 311 (1982); Hedge v. Hedge, 104 Dauphin 14
(Pa.C.P. 1982).
Courts have advanced four general objections to the recognition
of such an asset. First, an advanced degree and the concomitant in-
creased earning power are personal to the holder and are not "prop-
erty;" 41 second, the valuation of such an asset is entirely too specula-
tive;4 2 third, marriage is not a commercial partnership and neither
spouse's expectations are necessarily going to be met after divorce; 48
finally, increased earning potential is more appropriately considered
when awarding alimony rather than when distributing property."
These arguments, however, are inconsistent with other judicial pro-
nouncements45 involving equitable distribution problems and may in
fact be unpersuasive at the Pennsylvania appellate level. Examina-
tion is necessary, therefore, of the unsettled and often contradictory
decisions concerning intangible marital assets.
41. See, e.g., Millili v. Millili, I I Montgomery 38 (Pa. C.P. 1982); Hodge v. Hodge,
104 Dauphin 14 (Pa. C.P. 1982); Pratt v. Pratt, 68 Lancaster 311 (Pa. C.P. 1982). See also
Goldstein v. Goldstein, 97 Il. App. 3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard,
607 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr.
668 (1979); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977). But see, e.g.,
Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 268, 337 N.W.2d 332; In re Marriage of Lund-
berg, 107 Wis. 2d i, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982); DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa, 309 N.W.2d755 (Minn. 1981); In re Marriage
of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio App. 2d 458, 185
N.E.2d 773 (1961).
42. See, e.g., Hodge v. Hodge, 104 Dauphin 14 (Pa. C.P. 1982); Mahoney v. Mahoney,
91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 517 (1982); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761
(1980). For a comparison of various methods of valuing a professional degree or license, see
Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals: How the Law Can
Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 947; Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's
Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379
(1980); Raggio, Professional Goodwill and Professional Licenses as Property Subject to Dis-
tribution upon Dissolution of Marriage, 16 FAM. L.Q. 147 (1982); Comment, Compensation
for Financing a Spouse's Education: The Means of Economic Justice in Maine, 35 ME. L.
REV. 341 (1983); Note, The Supporting Spouse's Rights in the Others Professional Degree
Upon Divorce, 35 U, FLA. L. REv. 130 (1983); Note, Valuation of Spousal Interest in a
Professional Practice for Equitable Distribution: Hirschfield v. Hirschfield, 17 U. RICH. L.
REV. 383 (1983).
43. See. e.g., Northampton Brewery Corp. v. Lande, 138 Pa. Super. 235, 10 A.2d 583
(1939). But cf. D'Agostino v. D'Agostino, - R.I. - , 463 A.2d 200 (1983); Boyd v.
Boyd, 323 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. App. 1982); Bahr v. Bahr, 107 Wis. 2d 72, 318 N.W.2d 391
(1982); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 174 N.J. Super. 107, 415 A.2d 1174 (1980); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46
Ohio 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976) (all maintaining that a divorce proceeding is an action to
dissolve, wind up and distribute the assets and liabilities of a partnership).
44. See. e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982); Les-
man v. Lesman, 88 A.D. 2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 97
Ill. App. 3d 1023, 51 111. Dec. 397, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981); Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333,
631 P.2d 115 (1971); Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969) (all
advocating the consideration of recompensing the nonstudent spouse only through alimony
awards).
45. See infra notes 46-120 and accompanying test.
IV. Responses to the Four Traditional Objections
A. Enhanced Earning Capacity is Property
1. Goodwill.-As one Pennsylvania trial court recently noted,"
the "[v]aluation and distribution of goodwill in a professional prac-
tice under the Divorce Code of 1980 is a problem which has not yet
reached Pennsylvania's appellate courts."4 The Thoma court con-
fronted the question whether the husband's medical practice had an
intangible aspect which could properly be categorized as goodwill"
and subjected as an asset to equitable distribution. The Thona court
held that "[n]either location nor time in practice create an asset ca-
pable of generating additional income over that which a practitioner
of the husband's skill and experience could be expected to earn at
either his location or elsewhere. 49
The significance of the Thoma decision is not in the rejection of
goodwill in the husband's medical profession, but rather in the judi-
cial willingness to search for such an intangible asset despite the pat-
ent valuation difficulties.50 Thus, the Thoma court implied that in
certain circumstances goodwill may be an asset subject to equitable
distribution. This view is consistent with the goal of equitable distri-
bution theory in general: to define marital property broadly51 in or-
46. Thoma v. Thoma, 131 P.L.J. 68 (Pa. C.P., Allegheny County 1983). Judge Standish
delivered the opinion and decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Family
Division.
47. Id.
48. "Goodwill" has been defined as
Itihe advantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the
mere value of capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence
of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives from con-
stant or habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common celeb-
rity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental
circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities of prejudices.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS § 99, at 170 (6th ed. 1868).Courts
have often quoted this definition. See, e.g., Suther v. Suther, 28 Wash. App. 838, 843-44, 627
P.2d 110, 113 (1981); Dodson v. McElreath, 210 Miss. 160, 164, 48 So. 2d 861, 864 (1950).
Dodson points out that this definition is much broader than the older view, often attributed to
Lord Eldon, that goodwill "means nothing more than a probability that the old customers will
resort to the old place." Dodson, 210 Miss. at 165, 48 So. 2d at 864. The accounting profes-
sion has adopted an even broader definition of goodwill. See J.M. SMITH & K.F. SKOUSEN,
INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 283 (7th ed. 1982). See also Accounting Principles Board, Op.
17, "Intangible Assets," in FASB FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 266-72 (1981).
49. Thoma, 131 P.L.J. at 69.
50. Accord infra notes 90-138 and accompanying test.
51. Courts typically use a traditional BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY definition in holding
that increased earning capacity is not property. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429,
432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978) ("everything that has an exchangeable value or which goes to
make up wealth or estate"). The Graham court reasoned that increased earning capacity "does
not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on an open market. It is per-
sonal to the holder. It terminates on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be
assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed or pledged . . . In our view, it has none of the attributes
of property in the usual sense of the term." Graham, 194 Colo. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77. One
commentator, however, views this analysis as reverse reasoning. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES
der to achieve economic justice between the parties."
Like Pennsylvania's appellate courts, the majority of equitable
distribution jurisdictions53 have not yet considered the distribution of
goodwill54 upon marital dissolution. In courts that have considered
the issue, however, a general trend exists towards recognizing good-
will as a divisible asset subject to distribution. For example, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey, in Dugan v. Dugan,5 recently held that
an attorney's goodwill is property subject to equitable distribution.
The Dugan court reasoned that although future earning capacity per
se is not goodwill, nevertheless "when that future earning capacity
has been enhanced because reputation leads to probable future pa-
tronage from existing and potential clients, goodwill may exist and
have value. When that occurs the resulting goodwill is property sub-
ject to equitable distribution."
5
OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 5 (2d ed. 1975) (courts cannot justify denial of relief on the nonex-
istence of property rights since if the court grants protection, it has created a species of prop-
erty; if it refuses relief, then no property can exist because absent law, property ceases.)
52. See supra note 29. See also Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 384, 606 P.2d
1314, 1315 (1979); Foster & Freed, Law and the Family, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 1982, at 2, col.
4.
53. For a list of the equitable distribution jurisdictions, see supra note 10.
54. Historically, professional and commercial goodwill have been distinguished. While
the distinction appears to be eroding, professional goodwill is still viewed as inhering more in
the individual than in the commercial enterprise. For an in-depth discussion of this point, see
Note, Treating Professional Goodwill as Marital Property in Equitable Distribution States,
58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 554, 563-571 (1983). See generally Scriber, Professional Goodwill in Dis-
solution Proceedings: The Personification of Property, 17 GONz L. REV. 303 (1982); Com-
ment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional Goodwill as Community Property at
Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 TUL L. REV. 313 (1981).
55. 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2dl (1983). Accord In re Marriage of White, 98 Ill. App. 3d
380, 53 111. Dec. 786, 424 N.E.2d 421 (1981); Lockwood v. Lockwood, 205 Neb. 818, 290
N.W.2d 636 (1980); In re Marriage of Morris, 588 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); In re
Marriage of Goger, 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976). Contra Litman v. Litman, 115
Misc. 2d 230, 453 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1982); Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218
(1982); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343 (1981).
56. 92 N.J. at 433, 457 A.2d at 6. The Dugan court's distinction between future earning
capacity and goodwill is unclear. The court held that goodwill "is not simply a possibility of
future earnings, but a probability based on existing circumstances." Id. (emphasis added). The
court went on to state, however, that "[flor purposes of valuing the goodwill of a law practice,
the true enhancement to be evaluated is the likelihood of repeat patronage and a certain
degree of immunity from competition." 92 N.J. Super. 542, 554, 397 A.2d 374, 376 (1978)
(emphasis added). Thus, the court seems to view goodwill as the likelihood or probability of
repeat businesses. This probability is the property subject to equitable distribution. Goodwill,
then, like future earnings is in fact based on past performance.
An analogous discrepancy can be found in the decisions distinguishing between increased
future earning capacity and an educational degree. Thus far the courts have failed to explain
why one should be considered property and the other should not. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Hortsman, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1979) (potential for increase in future earning capac-
ity, made possible by wife's efforts in acquiring law degree, constituted the asset subject to
distribution); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (wife's property
interest in husband's degree is to be measured by her monetary contribution to his earning
capacity); Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (increase in husband's
earning capacity which resulted from a degree earned partly through the contributions of the
wife was an asset subject to division); Daniels v. Daniels, - Ohio App. - , 185 N.E.2d
773, 775 (1961) (husband's medical degree is the principal asset of the marriage and the wife
is entitled to alimony based on husband's right to practice medicine).
In spite of the intangible quality of goodwill, then, a noticeable
trend favors its inclusion in the valuation 57 of property subject to
equitable distribution. The last bastion against sweeping acceptance
of goodwill in marital dissolution proceedings is the concern that
goodwill is not a sufficiently vested interest to justify its recognition
as an asset. In the landmark community property case of Nail v.
Nail,5 8 the Texas Supreme Court refused to include the goodwill of a
medical practice in a property distribution following divorce. The
Nail court held the crucial consideration to be that the goodwill, al-
though a property right, could not "be characterized as an earned or
vested right or one which fixes any benefit in any sum at any future
time." ' 9 Thus, the decision ultimately centered around the concept of
vesting. 60 This dependency upon future factors is also required in the
area of retirement pensions.
2. Nonvested Pensions.-Divorces can be reasonably expected
between people who are financially strained. Moreover, "[i]n many
cases the parties will have only two major assets - the marital home
and the pension rights of one or both employee spouses - and the
pension may in fact be the larger of the two."61 The Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Butler County, in Kalinoski v. Kalinoski, addressed
the problem of whether a nonvested 2 pension was distributable as
57. One commentator has listed five methods of valuating goodwill: (1) expectancy
methods; (2) discounting expectancies to present value; (3) market-value; (4) buy-sell agree-
ments; and (5) excess income. Note, Treating Professional Goodwill as Marital Property in
Equitable Distribution States, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 554, 573 n. 119 (1983). See also Dugan v.
Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 436-45, 457 A.2d 1, 8-12 (1983). For a more detailed analysis of the five
methods of valuation, see Adams, Is Professional Goodwill Divisible Community Property?, 6
COMMUNITY PROP. J. 61 (1979); Norton, Professional Goodwill - Its Value in California
Marital Dissolution Cases, 3 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 9 (1976); Udinsky, An Economist's View
of Professional Goodwill in a Community Property System, 5 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 1 (1978);
Note, Valuation of Professional Goodwill upon Marital Dissolution, 7 Sw. U. L. REv. 186
(1975).
58. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972). The Nail decision has been severely criticized in Com-
ment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional Goodwill as Community Property at
Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 TUL. L. REV. 313, 319-322 (1981).
59. 486 S.W.2d at 764. Accord Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 350-51, 309
N.W.2d 343, 354-55 (1981) (goodwill is valuable only if future earnings are assured).
60. See infra notes 66.70 and accompanying text (analyzing concern for vesting).
61. Kalinoski v. Kalinoski, 9 FAM. L. REP. 3033 (Pa. C.P. Butler County 1982) (citing
Dickinson, Role of Retirement Plans, 10 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 644 (1975)). Like the
problems inherent in assetless career threshold divorces, this decision centered around the
problem of achieving an equitable distribution of marital property where there are little or no
tangible marital assets currently available.
62. The Kalinoski court pointed out that the purpose of the Uniform Property Act was
"to abolish anachronisms in the law of property and to abolish many out-of-date characteris-
tics which may have come down from the early feudal law of England, but which are out of
place in the modern law." 9 FAM. L. REP. at 3034. Pension and retirement benefits seem to fall
into three general categories: vested, mature, and accrued. A vested benefit is a benefit certain
to be paid, but the employee does not receive the payment until he retires or otherwise termi-
nates his employment relationship with the employer. A mature benefit is a benefit that a
beneficiary is immediately entitled to receive. An accrued or earned benefit is a benefit that
accrues as a result of employment, but the employee has no present guarantee of eventual
marital property.63 In deciding that such pensions are properly in-
cluded as marital assets, the Kalinoski court invoked an expansive
definition of property" compliant with the aims of equitable
distribution."'
The Kalinoski decision is noteworthy because it transcends
traditional definitions"6 of property in an effort to "[miake the law
for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the reali-
ties of matrimonial experience. '' 7 In holding that pension benefits,
whether vested" or not, are marital property the court reasoned that
"marital property is a 'species of common ownership' which becomes
a present interest in the future possession of the pension rights upon
the filing of a divorce action." 69 Thus, the contingency of the prop-
payment. Bonavich, Allocation of Private Pension Benefits in Illinois Divorce Proceedings, 29
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1979). It has been noted, however, that "the term 'vested right' is
conclusory - a right is vested when it has been so far perfected that it cannot be taken away
by statute." Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legisla-
tion, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692, 696 (1960).
63. See supra note 29.
64. "'Property' means 'one or more interests either legal or equitable, possessory or non-
possessory, present or future, in land, or in things other than land, including chases in action
S. .' "9 FAM. L. REP. at 3034 (citing Uniform Property Act sec. l(a) (act withdrawn 1966)).
The Kalinoski court noted that the concept of vesting was diametrically opposed to the goal of
equitable distribution since
[t]he notion of a vested interest came into being in a feudal society and was
intimately associated with the medieval concept of seisin . . . It has played an
important part in the law of future interest, and early assumed a crucial role in
the portion of that law dealing with the rule against perpetuities. On the other
hand and in a quite different contest the phrase, "vested rights", is occasionally
used to denote something to which constitutional guarantees may apply . . .
These now customary usages of the concept of vesting are clearly in no way
relevant to the question of effecting an equitable distribution upon the occasion
of a divorce. Our statute requires, in order that property be available for distri-
bution incident to a divorce, that it shall have been acquired during the mar-
riage. There is no reference to vesting ....
Kalinoski, 9 F#m. L. REP. at 3034 (quoting Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 345, 331 A.2d 257,
262 (1975) (emphasis in original).
65. See PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 102 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
66. Traditionally, property is "[o]wnership; the unrestricted and exclusive right to a
thing, the right to dispose of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude
everyone else from interfering with it." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1382 (4th ed. 1968). For a
case holding that this concept of property encompasses characteristics of exchange, transfer
and alienability, see Millili v. Millili, Ill Montgomery 38 (PaC.P. 1982).
67. 9 FAM. L. REP. 3033, 3035 (1972) (quoting PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 102(a)
(1) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
68. Other Pennsylvania trial courts have held that pension and retirement benefits which
have yet to vest in the recipient are neither a divisible property interest nor a factor in an
equitable distribution between spouses. See Tonetti v. Tonetti, 39 Lehigh 535 (Pa.C.P. 1982)
(since PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(e)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) excludes prop-
erty acquired subsequent to separation from definition of marital property, a pension plan in
which husband enjoyed no rights, vested or contingent, does not constitute marital property);
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 41 Beaver 7 (Pa. C.P. 1982) (pension plan must be vested to be included
in marital distribution scheme); McCandless v. McCandless, 23 Pa. D.&C.3d 741 (C.P. Butler
County 1981) (wife's non-contributory and unvested pension plan did not constitute marital
property).
69. Kalinoski, 9 FAM. L. REP. at 3035 (citations omitted). See also supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
erty interest affects the value, not the existence of the right itself.7 0
Having concluded that the nonvested pension plan was marital
property available for equitable distribution, the Kalinoski court
then tackled the seemingly complex mechanics of distribution.7 The
court elected to affix a present value72 to the contingent annuity
through computations based on actuarial tables.7 The court rea-
soned that valuation of nonvested pensions is no more speculative
than pain and suffering estimates and wrongful death awards.74 This
speculative valuation, then, is agreeable to both analogous areas of
the law and to the ideals of equitable distribution .7  In sum, by la-
beling nonvested pensions as deferred compensation rather than
mere expectancies, the Pennsylvania lower courts have effectively,
even if unintentionally, strengthened the foundation for recognizing
increased earning capacity as a marital asset subject to equitable
distribution.
3. Tort Claims Settlements.-Another area in which the
Pennsylvania courts have laid a foundation for recognizing increased
earning capacity as marital property is in the cases involving pro-
ceeds from the settlements of one spouse's personal injury suits. The
paradigm for this analogy is Platek v. Platek. 6 In Platek, the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court held that the Court of Common Pleas of
70. Accord In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 11. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979); Chis-
nell v. Chisnell, 182 Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978); Elliott v. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d
75 (Minnesota 1978).
71. 9 FAM L. REP. at 3036. The Kalinoski court pointed out that "There [were] really
only two choices: (1) retain jurisdiction and divide the pension benefits if, as, and when paid;
or (2) assign a present value to the contingent annuity, award the pension to the employee
spouse, and award other marital property (or a note) of offsetting value to the nonemployee
spouse." Id. The court preferred the latter approach of assigning a present value because
"[Il]ong term and deferred sharing of financial interests are obviously too susceptible to contin-
ued strife and hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally strive to avoid to the
greatest extent possible." Id. See also Hardie & Sutcliffe, Reserving Jurisdiction: A Potential
Trap, 2 CAL. LAW. 33 (1982) (discussing the practical problems associated with the reserva-
tion of jurisdiction).
72. In order to calculate present value, the court must utilize life expectancy data, vest-
ing information and employer contribution rates. The amount of a pension or profit sharing
interest included as marital property would be the present value of the interest multiplied by a
fraction whose numerator is the number of years or months of marriage during which time the
benefits were being accumulated. The denominator represents the total number of years or
months during which benefits were accumulated prior to divorce. For a more detailed discus-
sion of these calculations, see Jerry L.C. v. Lucille H.C., 448 A.2d 223 (Del. 1982). See also
In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 I1. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979). The cash contribution
method used by the master is another way to determine cash value. See Bloomer v. Bloomer,
84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978).
73. As the Kalinoski court noted, "[a]ctuarial science is based on probability. No simple
calculation will be correct because nobody knows the future." 9 FAM. L. REP. at 3036.
74. Kalinoski, 9 FAM. L. REP. at 3035. For an in-depth analysis of spousal rights in
pension plans, see Siegel & Buckmann, Unsolved Problems, I FAIRSHARaE 6 (1981); Freed 7
Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1981).
75. See supra note 65.
76. - Pa. Super. -, 454 A.2d 1059 (1982). The Platek court consisted of judges
Spaeth, Johnson and Hoffman. Judge Spaeth delivered the opinion of the court.
Butler County had erred in directing partition of a portion of the
proceeds of a settlement of the wife's personal injury suit, since such
proceeds constitute marital property."
The parties in Platek were married in 1969. During the mar-
riage, the wife was injured in an accident which resulted in the filing
of trespass action.78 The suit was settled, however, and the proceeds
deposited in the Plateks' joint savings accounts. Thereafter, in July
1980, the wife brought a divorce action and withdrew the proceeds
from the account. The husband, in turn, petitioned the lower court to
enjoin the wife from disposing of the proceeds of the settlement.7 9
The lower court ordered a partition of a portion of the proceeds
and froze the balance pending further court action.80 The lower
court reasoned that the wife's appropriation of all of the proceeds for
her own use invited a "Vento partition."81 The court stressed that
"by her conduct in this case, the wife may have forfeited her right to
equitable distribution, and her rights may be relegated to one equal
division of the property under Vento." '2
The Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated and remanded for
further proceedings. The appellate tribunal held that although the
common pleas court correctly characterized the proceeds as marital
property, it erred by directing a partition of only a portion of them.
Instead, the Superior Court reasoned that the lower court should
have placed the entire sum into the marital property kitty and equi-
tably distributed it pursuant to the ten factors enumerated in section
401(d) of the Divorce Code. 83 The Superior Court assigned more of
the settlement to the wife.8" Therefore, to the extent that the pro-
77. - Pa. Super. at--_-, 454 A.2d at 1059.
78. The trespass claim consisted of the wife's claim for damages for her personal injuries
as well as the husband's claim for loss of consortium. - Pa. Super. -, 454 A.2d 1059,
1060 (1982). For further discussion of loss consortium claims, see Comment, Who Should
Recover For Loss of Consortium, 35 ME. L. REV. 295 (1983); Comment, Loss of Consortium
A Derivative Injury Giving Rise to a Separate Cause of Action, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1344
(1982); Note, Loss of Consortium, Contributory Negligence and Contribution: An Old Prob-
lem and a New Solution, 24 B.C. L. REV. 403 (1983); Note, Consortium: A Survey of the
Present Law, 19 J. FAM. L. 707 (1981).
79. Platek, - Pa. Super. 454 A.2d 1059, 1060.
80. Id.
81. The phrase "Vento partition" refers to the case of Vento v. Vento, 256 Pa. Super.
91, 389 A.2d 615 (1978). The Vento court held that where a husband had wrongfully appro-
priated money in a joint bank account for his own use, the misappropriation "works a revoca-
tion of the estate by the fiction of the appropriation's being an offer of an agreement to destroy
the estate and an acceptance of that offer when the other spouse starts suit: the property is
then fit for accounting and division." Id. at 93, 389 A.2d at 617 (1978) (quoting Stemniski v.
Stemniski, 403 Pa. 38, 42, 169A.2d 51, 53 (1961)).
82. Platek, - Pa. Super. at -, 454 A.2d at 1061.
83. Id. For a list of the ten factors, see supra note 17.
84. Cf In re Marriage of Mason, 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 155 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979)
(community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the
injuries unless the interests of justice require another disposition). The difference between the
Mason and Platek decisions is that the courts were interpreting two distinct statutes. CAL.
CIv. CODE § 4800(c) (West 1980) provides in pertinent part:
ceeds of the settlement included payment for future pain or suffer-
ing, wage loss or medical expenses, the entire sum was nevertheless
subjected to equitable distribution.
The crucial issue in Platek was whether one's physical well-be-
ing constituted "property acquired prior to the marriage .. ."a If
so, the proceeds paid in compensation for damages to that property
would be excepted from the marital kitty. The Superior Court con-
cluded that the wife's physical well-being did not constitute separate
property."' The court reasoned that if one were to lose a leg in an
accident, and receive $100,000 in settlement of the claim, the
$100,000 would not properly be characterized as property acquired
in exchange for property (the lost leg) acquired prior to the
marriage.
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But if the physical well-being that a spouse brings into the mar-
riage is not treated as separate property, then why should his mind
be treated differently? The increased earning potential that results
from the marital investment in education is nothing more than an
investment in human capital.8 8 The property interest in human capi-
tal, then, is the aggregate total of an individual's earning power
made possible by skill, education and application. Consonant with
the reasoning in Platek, this property interest is marital property.
Thus, the decision fortifies the basis for recognizing the calculation
of future earnings as an asset capable of distribution. 9
B. Valuation is Not Too Speculative
The second reason often advanced against recognizing earning
[C]ommunity property personal injury damages shall be assigned to the
party who suffered the injuries unless the court, after taking into account the
economic condition and needs of each party . . . determines that the interests of
justice require another disposition. In such case, the community property per-
sonal injury damages shall be assigned to the respective parties in such propor-
tions as the court determines to be just, except that at least one-half of such
damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries ....
The Platek court, on the other hand, noted that the Legislature did not intend to except any
part of the proceeds of the settlement of personal injury claims from the definition of marital
property. The House version of PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983-
1984), which specifically excluded such proceeds at the ambit of marital property, was rejected
by the Senate. See Platek, - Pa. Super. -, 454 A.2d at 1061.
85. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(e)(l) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
86. - Pa. Super...., -, 454 A.2d at 1061. But cf. Jurek v. Jurek, 124 Ariz.
596, 606 P.2d 812 (1980) (The body which the husband brought to the marriage is certainly
his separate property).
87. Platek, - Pa.Super. at - , 454 A.2d at 1061.
88. See supra note 14. See generally C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS 622-23 (8th ed.
1981); W. MCMAHON, INVESTMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION xi (1974); W. NICHOLSON, IN-
TERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND AS APPLICATION 443 (2d ed. 1979) T. SCHULTZ, INVEST-
ING IN PEOPLE (1981); L. THUROW, INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL 1 (1970).
89. Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 703 (Ky. 1982) (award of worker's compensa-
tion intended to replace lost wages which otherwise might have been earned in the future held
to constitute marital property available for equitable distribution).
capacity as a marital asset is that any other decision would create, an
insurmountable problem of speculative valuation of such an asset.
Yet once a property interest in earning potential or human capital is
acknowledged, calculation proves no more onerous than that used in
several other legal contexts.
1. Wrongful Death Damages.-Estimating damages in wrongful
death actions 0 is an obvious example of judicial acceptance of spec-
ulative valuations of property rights. In such cases, the prevailing
legal theory is that "the surviving spouse had a property interest in
the future income of the deceased and should be compensated for the
loss. ' 91 Similarly, since an investment in human capital represents
the diversion of marital income from present needs in anticipation of
expected increases in future earnings," the asset9 so created must
also constitute marital property. The actuarial present value of the
expected future income of the asset, then, would represent its
value.94 This calculation would closely resemble the procedure for
determining the marital interest in a pension or retirement benefit
based on a percentage of the interest acquired during the marriage.
The nonstudent spouse, in turn, would be entitled to a share propor-
tionate to her contribution during the marriage.9 5 If the wage earner
had been wrongfully killed the day before the divorce, the surviving
spouse would have recovered for loss of future support damages
based partly on the present value of anticipated future earnings.
These future earnings take into account probable future increases in
earning capacity." The virtue of consistency in the law demands the
recognition of a similar cause of action in divorce.97
2. Homemakers' Services.-A spouse's contributions to a
90. King, Divorce Settlements: The Value of Human Capital, 18 TRIAL 48, 50 (1982).
[hereinafter cited as King].
91. id.
92. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
93. Skeptics have argued that although expenditures are often made for the purpose of
education, they do not result in the creation of any observable capital asset. Professor King
points out that although the accumulation of human capital is something that cannot be seen
or touched, nevertheless it can be measured. See King, supra note 90 at 50. (economists have
utilized these observable changes in earnings to impute the dollar amount of human capital
embodied in members of particular professions and to calculate the annual rate of return typi-
cally received on this investment).
94. This approach is consistent with the recognition that property may have other values
to a person that more equitably measure its worth than just market value. See C. McCoR-
MICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 44 (1935).
95. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
96. See Smail v. Flock, 407 Pa. 148, 180 A.2d 59 (1962) (measure of loss in a wrongful
death claim is what the decedent would have probably earned by his intellectual and bodily
labor based upon the best available evidence, even though such evidence does not produce
precise proof).
97. The analogy is particularly compelling if the divorce is granted on fault grounds
against the wage earner spouse. The dissolution would then amount to the death of the marital
unit and a wrongful denial of an expectancy of monetary contribution.
marriage are both tangible and intangible.98 The tangible contribu-
tions are easily conceptualized since direct expenditures to the mari-
tal unit have an ascertainable market value. The intangible invest-
ments, however, are a different type of property which invoke special
consideration. Nonetheless, to achieve economic justice between the
parties, the Pennsylvania courts have consistently taken account of
homemaker's contribution to the marriage when dividing the marital
property." The Divorce Code, however, provides no formula or
touchstone for valuing either spouse's contribution as a homemaker.
Consequently, the Pennsylvania courts will have to look to other ju-
risdictions for guidance.
Generally, state courts that have encountered the problem of
valuing homemakers' services have used one of the following theoret-
ical approaches: replacement cost,10 opportunity cost, 01 breach of
an implied contract,10 2 or dissolution of a partnership. 08 Since the
Pennsylvania courts have not yet adopted one of these four valuation
methods each will be discussed. The competing approaches are im-
portant because they represent a judicial determination to recognize
a property interest despite any inherent valuation problems.
(a) Replacement cost.-The replacement cost method operates
as if the homemaker had been removed from the home and is re-
placed by one or more qualified persons from the market.' Then,
each job that the homemaker normally would have performed re-
ceives a wage figure equivalent to the market rate in the given loca-
tion for that respective job. This rate is then multiplied by the num-
ber of hours per week spent doing each task. 0 5 When all of the job
categories are assigned a weekly value, the sum represents the value
of the homemaker's contribution to the marriage for one week. More
98. Fourteen states plus the District of Columbia have recognized by statute the contri-
butions that a homemaker makes to a marriage. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (1962);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1981); IND. CODE § 31-1-
11.5-11 (Burns 1982); IOwA CODE § 598.21 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 19, § 722-!
(1982-1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 208, § 34 (West 1981); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.330
(Vernon 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (1981); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236, Part B.,
§§ 5 and 6 (McKinney 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1981); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.105 (1979-1980); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 401 and 501 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-16.1 (1956); VA. CODE §§ 20-107 (1982).
99. See, e.g., Maser v. Maser, 112 Montgomery 117 (Pa. C.P. 1983); McAliey v.
McAliey, 110 Montgomery 359 (Pa. C.P. 1982); Starn v. Starn, 28 Crawford 42 (Pa. C.P.
1982); Burkhard v. Burkhard, 31 Somerset 210 (Pa. C.P. 1981).
100. See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 113-122 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 139-150 and accompanying text.
104. Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupation, 17
FAM. L.Q. 41, 50 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hauserman].
105. For example, if the homemaker spends on the average three hours per week doing
the laundry, and the local market rate for a laundress is four dollars per hour, the homemaker
is credited with contributing twelve dollars per week to the marital unit.
properly, this total is what it would cost to pay someone to do all of
the jobs that collectively constitute the title of homemaker. 1 6 Some
courts have even held that when dividing the marital property, the
judge may consider the homemaker's contribution to be greater than
or at least equal to that of the working spouse.10 7 A potential quirk
in this technique, however, is that spouses from affluent households
which employ maids may be unduly discriminated against because of
social status. Thus, despite the obvious intricacies' °s involved in valu-
ing intangibles such as child counseling and companionship, courts
have been willing to grant the homemaker equitable credit for past
contributions.
(b) Opportunity cost.-The second general method for valuating
homemakers' contributions is the opportunity cost approach. This
scheme rests partially on the premise that individuals choose to pur-
sue the most lucrative and personally satisfying career possible.' 09
For the homemaker, it is assumed that homemaking is the chosen
occupation which will yield the greatest rewards. The second inquiry
is what occupation was given up for homemaking.1 0 When a market
value is placed on this lost occupation, it follows logically that the
homemaker's services are worth at least as much as the relinquished
activity."' Prior work experience will undoubtedly carry great
weight in determining the second best occupation. "If there is no
employment history on which to base an occupational decision, con-
sideration is given to the kinds of jobs people from [the] same geo-
graphic and socioeconomic background perform.""'
106. One commentator has suggested that if the wife has been a devoted homemaker
and has taken care of the home efficiently, she can be credited with having performed twenty-
four individual jobs. See HUROWITZ, DiVOiRCE: YOUR FAULT, MY FAULT, No FAULT 72
(1981).
107. See, e.g., Bussewitz v. Bussewitz, 75 Wis. 2d 78, 248 N.W.2d 417 (1977); Lacey v.
Lacey, 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N.W.2d 142 (1970). For an example of a replacement cost chart,
see Hurowitz, supra note 106, at 73.
108. For a complete analysis of the shortcomings of the replacement cost approach, see
Hauserman, supra note 104, at 50-51.
109. This assumption further weakens the arguments against recognizing increased
earning potential as a marital asset. Critics have maintained that if a divorced wage earner
changes jobs he may never realize the expected return that usually accompanies the increased
earning capacity. Under this assumption, however, the most rewarding vocation will have a
value personal to the worker greater than or at least equal to the market value of the occupa-
tion previously abandoned. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. See also In re Marriage
of Ruiz, 29 Or. App. 273, 563 P.2d 168 (1977) (where husband's reduced earnings at time of
trial were a result of his voluntary action in accepting demotion, his earnings prior to demotion
were a relevant consideration).
110. Professor Nancy Hauserman has labelled this the "next best" occupation. Hauser-
man, supra note 104, at 51.
11. In calculating the value of the second best occupation, courts must be cognizant of
such factors as age, vocational skills, health and employability prior to and during the mar-
riage. Cf. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d)(3) and (7) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984)
(when equitably distributing marital property courts must consider similar factors).
112. Hauserman, supra note 104, at 52.
Clearly this approach is no less speculative than estimating in-
creased earning capacity utilizing methods borrowed from calcula-
tions in personal injury, wrongful death and worker's compensation
actions.
(c) Breach of implied contract.-The third technique that
courts have utilized for appraising homemakers' services is the im-
plied contract 13 theory. This method of valuation stresses the home-
maker's expectation of not having to work outside the home as long
as she fulfills her duty as a homemaker. Courts have even extended
this theory to calculate the property rights of unmarried cohabi-
tants.114 In a sense, the implied contract view is really a modification
of the opportunity cost theory.115 Since she relied on an implied con-
tract of maintenance, the homemaking spouse elected to abandon
her own avenues of economic independence. Because marital prop-
erty rights are defined only in breach, the extent of each spouse's
rights and obligations is not apparent until the marital breakdown. 6
Therefore, Pennsylvania courts seeking to promote economic justice
between the parties should be well disposed to fashion new theories
of relief where necessary despite problems of valuation.
The Oregon courts, in particular, have expanded the bundle of
marital property rights by ruling that marital interests may be cre-
ated even in the absence of express agreements. 7 Contrary to the
common law presumption that a husband had sole claim to
the services of his wife, whether they were rendered to him in his
home or business, 1 8 the Oregon courts have reasoned that home-
makers make an equal contribution to the finances of the family,
since they enable the working spouse to earn a salary without incur-
113. An implied contract may be either implied in fact or in law. The formation and
contours of an agreement implied in fact are inferred from the parties' conduct and expecta-
tions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 21, 228. In contrast, contracts implied in
law do not originate in the parties' intentions or acts; rather, they are devices imposed by
courts to prevent unjust enrichment. IA CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 19, at 46 (1963). A contract
implied in law adapts easily to the homemaker valuation problem since an implied contract to
pay the reasonable value of services performed prevents unjust enrichment to the working
spouse. See, e.g., Elias v. Elias, 428 Pa. 159, 237 A.2d 215 (1968) (advocating the implied
contract theory).
114. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. App. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d
106 (1976).
115. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of the value of the corporate executive wife, see generally HEL-
FRICH, THE SOCIAL ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE WIFE (1965); HOWE, PINK COLLAR WORKERS:
INSIDE THE WORLD OF WOMEN'S WORK (1977); SIDENBERG, CORPORATE WIVES: CORPORATE
CASUALTIES (1973); Margetts, Divorce Executive Sytle, DUN'S REV. Oct 1971. (Discussion of
the value of the corporate executive wife).
117. See Sherman v. Sherman, 38 Or. App. 321, 590 P.2d 256 (1979) (wife compen-
sated for not improving her own employable skills in order to carry out her role as
homemaker).
118. See 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 173 (1935); Warren, Husband's
Right to Wife's Services, 38 HARV. L. REV. 421 (1925).
ring all of the out-of-pocket expenses incident to the daily mainte-
nance of a household.1 ' Notwithstanding the difficulty of ascertain-
ing the value of domestic services, then, the judicial reluctance to
recognizing an implied contract for homemakers' services has given
way to the need for fair results.
The increased earning capacity in a student-spouse marriage
could merit identical treatment. The nonstudent spouse supported
her mate through the years of postgraduate education with the ex-
pectation that the marital unit would be enriched in the future
through the realization of the student spouse's increased earning po-
tential. Upon divorce, this expectation dissolves along with the mari-
tal unit. Either an implied-in-law 20 or an implied-in-fact 21 bargain
will prevent unjust enrichment to the student spouse. 2
3. Closely-held Corporations.-Homemakers' services is not
the only marital interest that has presented valuation problems for
divorce courts. The valuation of interests in closely-held corpora-
tions "' has also generated tremendous calculation problems; the pro-
cess seems more a matter of "judgment and opinion rather than
mathematics."'124 Nevertheless, Pennsylvania divorce courts have un-
hesitatingly assigned values to the stocks of closely-held corporations
despite the inexactness of the calculation.'2 The Pennsylvania courts
have guidance in this undertaking, however, in the factors enumer-
ated in Revenue Ruling 59-60126 which provides in part that in valu-
119. See, e.g., Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978) (reasoning that property
interests may be created even in the absence of express agreements if the intent of the parties
so warrants).
120. See supra note 113.
121. Id.
122. Courts may feel compelled to utilize an implied-in-fact theory where the expecta-
tions of the non-student spouse are more objective. The basic tenets of equitable distribution,
however, may track more closely with the implied-in-law approach since the trial judge is
given broad discretion to fashion a just division of the marital property. See Ruth v.Ruth,
Pa. Super. -, 462 A.2d 1351 (1983) (though the Divorce Code is silent on the matter of
the scope of appellate review, an abuse of discretion standard is proper). Cf. Oswald v. Os-
wald, 263 Pa. Super. 85, 397 A.2d 7 (1979) (advocating a manifest abuse of discretion test
prior to the enactment of the 1980 Divorce Code).
123. In a closely-held corporation, the stock is held in few hands, or in few families, and
is not at all, or only rarely, bought or sold. Kascle, Valuation of Closely-held Corporation, 43
TAXES - THE TAX MAGAZINE, 454 (July 1965). As a result, the "aluation of stock of a closely
held company is an attempt to determine the fair market value of an asset which by definition
does not have a market value..." Tierney, A New Approach to the Valuation of Common
Stock of Closely Held Companies, J. TAX'N 14 (July 1962).
124. Banks, Present Value and the Close Corporation, 49 TAXES - THE TAX MAGAZINE,
33, 35 (Jan. 1971).
125. See, e.g., Flojo v. Flojo, 42 Bucks 37 (Pa. C.P. 1983) (employing a capitalization of
earnings approach).
126. Revenue Ruling 59-60, 1959-1C.B. 237 sets forth eight factors to use in the valua-
tion of closely held corporate stocks for estate and gift tax purposes. These eight factors
include:
(1) the nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its inception;
(2) the economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the specific industry
ating the stock of the corporation, "earnings may be the most impor-
tant criterion of value. ' 2 Present value is computed by multiplying
projected earnings by a capitalization factor tied to a rate of return.
This approach converts future income into present value and could
be useful in valuing the increased earning potential of a degreed
spouse. 2s These factors aid the appraiser in gathering the informa-
tion needed to calculate the value of closely-held businesses.
Many of the factors used in Revenue Ruling 59-60 could also
apply to the calculation of a degreed individual's increased earning
capacity. For example, by comparing the individual spouse's earning
capacity history with that of others in the same profession and local-
ity, one can reasonably project future increases. Past earnings are
used as a base and the net result is tempered by the economic pros-
pects of the economy in general and the spouse's profession in partic-
ular. Clearly the need to assess the impact of a new No-Fault Insur-
ance law, for example, on the earning potential of torts specialists is
not more speculative than gauging what effect development of a low
cost soft contact lens will have on a company that manufacturers
eyeglass frames. Both depend on the appraiser's common sense and
experience and the completeness of the available information; neither
is significantly more speculative than valuating increased earning po-
tential gained through advanced education.
In the areas of both homemakers' services and closely-held cor-
porations, then, divorce courts in Pennsylvania and other states have
recognized a need to undertake a difficult valuation process despite
the obvious problems.1 29 Thus, the precedents have already been
in particular;
(3) the book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business;
(4) the earning capacity of the company;
(5) the dividend-paying capacity;
(6) whether or not the enterprise has goodwill of other intangible value;
(7) sales of the stock and the size of the block of stock to be valued; and
(8) the market price of stocks of similar line of business having their stocks actively
traded in a free and open market, either on an exchange or over-the-counter.
Courts have assigned various weights to each factor according to the property valued and the
circumstances of each case. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f) (1981).For an in depth analysis of the
preceding eight factors, see Aronson; Valuing Closely Held Business for Equitable Distribu-
tion, 108 N.J.L.J. 549 (1981). See also Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super, 187, 392 A.2d 621
(1978) (discussing the application of the eight factors).
127. Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237, 238.
128. See Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1969);
Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. Rv.
590, 604-612 (1974) (analysis of determining increased earning capacity). See also infra notes
134-137 and accompanying text.
129. Oddly enough, in some cases the student spouse may in fact have an equitable
interest in the earning capacity of the homemaking spouse. For example, the nonstudent
spouse may have elected to relinquish training in the area of preschool child care in order to
work as a waitress or other unrelated job to support the student spouse through school. If the
marriage produces children, it is likely that the nonstudent spouse will be saddled with this
responsibility as well since upon receiving his degree the student spouse will likely be the
principal wage earner. Further, assuming that upon divorce the nonstudent spouse elects to
firmly entrenched in marital dissolution doctrine for providing ade-
quately for the nonstudent spouse by recognizing enhanced earning
capacity as an interest subject to equitable division. 180
4. Increased Earnings of the Degreed Spouse.-Two basic
techniques are available to calculate the value of a professional de-
gree earned during a marriage. The first approach is a cost evalua-
tion calculation which considers both the direct and indirect
purchase prices of the degree. The direct costs are those marital
sums expended for tuition, student fees, library and textbook costs.
The indirect cost is the loss of potential earnings during the period of
study.1"' The cost value of the education is the sum of the direct and
indirect costs.13 2 The primary shortcoming of this approach, how-
ever, is that it fails to account for the degreed spouse's capacity to
draw a prospective income stream. Thus, it does not consider the
worth of the degree as a final product.133 The second approach, in-
come capacity valuation would correct this deficiency, however.
This method attempts to determine the difference in the remain-
ing worklife earnings of the student spouse before and after receiving
his degree. The value of a professional degree, therefore, is computed
over and above the value of a four year college education."' An ad-
justment must then be made for peak earning periods and subse-
quent declines or levelings off of income.' Finally, the appraiser
must determine what part of the increased earnings is attributable to
the education per se rather than the experience acquired since grad-
pursue her temporarily delayed interest in pre-school child care, the experience she gained
during the marriage would undoubtedly enhance her marketability. That this forced enhance-
ment can be attributed to the student spouse, however, seems tenuous at best.
130. The crucial factor, according to one commentator, is not the eventual earnings of
the degreed spouse but rather the effect of the present right to practice a profession on the
spouse's earning degree. See Comment, Family Law: Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisi-
ble as Property upon Divorce?, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 545 (1981).
131. See Schultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POL. ECON. 571 (1960) (dis-
cussing the cost opportunity calculations). This calculation also closely approximates the op-
portunity cost approach valuating homemakers services. See supra note 115.
132. Of course the direct purchase cost should only reflect the amount of marital funds
actually expended. For example, The Pennsylvania Divorce Code excludes property acquired
by gift or inheritance from marital property. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(e)(3) (Pur-
don Supp. 1983-1984). Assuming that the student spouse uses money received by inheritance
to finance his education, this sum should not be included when arriving at the direct purchase
cost.
133. Economists and financial consultants have long recognized that value is a prospec-
tive rather than a retrospective concept. See I J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY
237 (1937).
134. For an example of a case utilizing the capitalization of income approach to valua-
tion, see Lynn v. Lynn, 91 N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982) (trial judge reduced the present
value of the defendant's assumed earnings as a doctor by that amount shown on acturial tables
to represent the medium income of a male four-year college graduate).
135. Economists recognize that for persons of higher educational achievement, the peak
earning periods range between ages forty-five and fifty-four. Miller, Annual and Lifetime In-
come in Relation to Education: 1939-59, 50 AM. EcoN. REV. 962 (1960).
uation. This determination is premised on the belief that income in
the later years of one's profession is less a direct result of the educa-
tional experience than income earned immediately after gradua-
tion.136 Concededly some degree of speculation is involved in the val-
uation of income earning potential. As discussed above,1 87 however,
divorce courts have been willing to speculate on the values of other
marital assets. More importantly, while dangers of speculation exist
on one side of the balance, the inequities faced by the nonstudent
spouse weigh more heavily on the other.
C. Marriage as an Economic Enterprise
The third argument generally advanced against recognizing in-
creased earning capacity as a marital asset is that marriage is not a
commercial enterprise and neither spouse's expectations are necessa-
rily going to be met after divorce.13 8 Critics maintain that while ter-
mination of the marital unit represents the disappointment of both
financial and nonfinancial expectations, it does not represent a com-
mercial investment loss.'3 9
It has long been recognized, however, that "marriage is a joint
undertaking, that in many ways is akin to a partnership."' 4 0 Division
of property upon divorce conforms to this theory of shared enterprise
and joint contribution to the marital partnership. While marriage is
not a business arrangement in which the parties keep track of their
respective debits and credits on a day to day basis, nevertheless,
upon dissolution the trial court attempts to reconstruct and value
both the financial and nonfinancial contributions of each spouse. The
resultant property division is based on a treatment of the marital
relationship as a de facto economic partnership in which the parties
share both benefits and burdens of the marriage.'
136. Instead, the income earned in later years is more directly related to the degree of
experience and skill acquired after graduation. One commentator has suggested the use of a
sliding fraction to readjust the proportionate value of the education against the value of the
experience and skill beyond the education. See Comment, The Interest of the Community in a
Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 590, 609-610 (1974).
137. See supra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
139. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 605, 442A.2d 1062, 1070 (1982) (rec-
ompense for the disappointed expectations resulting from the failure of the marriage to endure
available to the spouses on a strictly commercial basis).
140. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 224, 320 A.2d 496, 501 (1974).
141. For further discussion of how marriage is similar to an economic partnership, see
Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: the Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable
Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); McCall, Dissolving the Economic Partnership
of Marriage, 14 U.W. AUSTR. L. REV. 365 (1982); Comment, The Implied Partnership: Eq-
uitable Alternative to Contemporary Methods of Postmarital Property Distribution, 26 U.
FLA. L. REV. 221 (1974). Cf. Comment, Meretrecious Relationships - Property Rights: A
Meretrecious Relationship May Create an Implied Partnership, 48 WASH. L. REv. 635
(1972) (applying the analogy to relationships involving unmarried cohabitants).
The partnership concept recognizes that noneconomic contribu-
tions are as essential to the marriage as financial contributions. 42
Part of the rationale behind recognizing intangible noneconomic con-
tributions such as homemakers' services is that these services have
enabled the supporting spouse to achieve his station in life and, in so
doing, have enriched the marital enterprise.' The factors enumer-
ated in the Pennsylvania Divorce Code 144 further emphasize the eco-
nomic partnership theory of marriage and focus on an equitable dis-
tribution of marital assets.' 5 The marital assets distributed to each
party, then, simply represent the capital product of the economic
venture.
Pennsylvania courts have universally recognized that a true
partnership relationship depends upon a contract between the parties
to carry on an enterprise for profit.' 4a The contract need not be ex-
pressly stated however. Rather, the partnership agreement can be
implied from the conduct and circumstances of the parties. 47 Since
the partnership concept embraces relationships carried on for profit,
at first glance the marital relationship seems to betray this require-
ment.'4 8 A closer look at marriage, though, through the court's eyes,
142. The financial contributions made to the marriage will weigh heavier on the scale
when the duration of the marriage has been too short for noneconomic contributions to assume
any significance. Presumably a marriage of longer duration represents a sincere and devoted
effort of noneconomic contributions. If the nonsupporting spouse has been married previously,
however, this presumption may be weakened. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(d)(2) (Put-
don Supp. 1983-1984) instructs Pennsylvania divorce courts to be cognizant of any prior mar-
riage to either party. There is a general tendency to award less economic relief when one of the
spouses has been married previously. The underlying rationale seems to be that marital part-
ners who have been married before are less committed to the new marital venture. See, e.g.,
Pascarella v. Pascarella, 165 N.J. Super. 558, 398 A.2d 921 (1979) (The court is duty bound
to take into consideration any prior marriages of either spouse). But cf Evans v. Reading Co.,
242 Pa. Super. 209, 363 A.2d 1234 (1976) (evidence of remarriage held to be inadmissible in
wrongful death suit).
143. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
144. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note
17.
145. For example, the length of the marriage bears directly on the equities of distribu-
tion. A court would not make the same assignments for a three-year marriage and a thirty-
year marriage. Moreover, each spouse's contribution as a homemaker takes into consideration
the nonfinancial benefits that are essential to an economic partnership such as a marriage.
Finally, each spouse's contribution or dissipation in the acquistion, preservation, depreciation
or appreciation of the marital property established the nature and value of the marital assets.
146. See, e.g., Murphy v. Burke, 454 Pa. 391, 311 A.2d 904 (1973) (partnership comes
into being, as do all contracts, through agreement); Ferris v. Jones, 27 Cambria 82 (1963)
(partnership agreement may be expressly created or implied from consideration of all attend-
ing facts and circumstances); Perri v. Chiavaroli, 370 Pa. 495, 88 A.2d 798 (1952) (true part-
nership relationship depends upon express or implied contract); Zuback v. Bakmaz, 346 Pa.
279, 29 A.2d 473 (1943) (ascertainment of intention of parties to express or implied contract
is essential in determining whether they are in fact "partners inter sese").
147. Accord supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text.
148. See Northhampton Brewery Corp. v. Lande, 138 Pa. Super. 235, 10 A.2d 583
(1939) (since partnership theory presumes an enterprise carried on for profit, an implied part-
nership could not exist if wife were a homemaker and husband a wage earner since spouses
would not depend on an independent business for support).
reveals the deceptive simplicity of this anachronistic requirement.
Part of the rationale behind recognizing the contributions of the
homemaker spouse is that marriage is an economic enterprise in
which nonfinancial services can equal or exceed financial contribu-
tions. Any "accession or increase of good from [either spouse's] la-
bor or exertion" 1 9 inures to the benefit of the marital unit. Thus, the
marriage profits from the contributions of both the homemaker and
wage earner spouses. In essence, then, an action for divorce and eq-
uitable distribution of property is really an action for the dissolution
of a partnership entity and for an accounting of the profits. 150 There
should be no difference between dividing the value of a house ac-
quired during the marriage and dividing the value of an educational
degree since both represent fruits of a dissolved partnership. Conse-
quently, the most equitable method for recognizing the partnership
theory of marriage is to assign the marital assets through property
distribution rather than through an alimony award.
D. Inadequacy of Alternatives
Another usual objection is that the student-spouse syndrome 51
is better considered when awarding alimony or some other remedy
than when distributing the marital property. Section 501 of the Di-
vorce Code specifically allows both one spouse's contributions to the
education to the other 8 2 and the earning capacity of both parties 58
to be factors in alimony. In fact, the current trend in the Pennsylva-
nia trial courts is to consider the contribution by one party to the
education of the other party only when determining alimony
awards.1 54 This preference seems to be at odds, however, with the
149. "Profit" is defined as "any accession or increase of good from labor or exertion,
comprehending the acquisition of anything valuable, intellectual or corporeal, temporal or spir-
itual." FUNK AND WAGNALL'S NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY 1979 (16th ed. 1947).
150. Courts faced with either the dissolution of a partnership or the dissolution of a
marriage are vested with broad discretion to fashion orders necessary to serve the best interests
of the parties. Compare Gee v. Gee, - Pa. Super. -, 460 A.2d 358 (1983) (equitable
distribution of marital assets is within the sound discretion and judgment of the trial court)
with Hankin v. Hankin, 279 Pa. Super. 179, 420 A.2d 1090 (1980) (equity court faced with
partnership dissolution may exercise wide discretion in serving best interests of all of the
parties).
151. See supra note 2.
152. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 501(b)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) provides for
the consideration of "[tihe contribution by one party to the education, training or increased
earning power of the other party."
153. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 501(b)(l) provides that "[iln determining
whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the nature, amount, duration, and manner of
payment of alimony, the court should consider all relevant factors including: .. .the relative
earnings and earning capacities of the parties."
154. See. e.g., Hodge v. Hodge, 104 Dauphin 14 (Pa. C.P. 1983) (although a medical
degree is not property, the increased earning capacity of the degree holder is an important
factor in alimony): Millili v. Millili, 111 Montgomery 38 (Pa. C.P. 1982) (contributions by
one spouse to the earning capacity of the other should be a consideration in alimony award).
legislative intent to consider such factors in both property distribu-
tion and alimony. The legislature, in enacting the Code, specifically
provided that the court consider the contribution of one spouse to the
increased earning power of the other in both property division and
maintenance.1 58
At least one court has praised reimbursement alimony 56 as the
most equitable way to redress sacrifices made by a non-student
spouse who has suffered a loss or reduction of support or has been
deprived of a better standard of living when a divorce follows on the
heels of the attainment of an educational degree. 57 The nonstudent
spouse would then be reimbursed for all financial contributions made
towards the other's education, including school commuting expenses,
tuition and book expenses, household maintenance costs, and any
other sums expended by the nonstudent spouse that aided the stu-
dent spouse in obtaining his degree. Thus, reimbursement alimony is
simply a restitutional remedy aimed at preventing a windfall to the
student spouse. 6 Yet oddly enough, only those monetary contribu-
tions made by the supporting spouse with the mutual expectation
155. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 501(b)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) is identical
to 23 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 401(d)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). Each instructs
the court to consider "[t]he contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased
earning power of the other party" as a relevant factor when proportioning marital property (§
401) and allowing alimony (§ 501).
156. Reimbursement alimony is a creature of the court's equity powers. The general
theme underlying an award of this type of alimony is that "regardless of the appropriateness of
permanent alimony or the presence or absence of marital property to be equitably distributed,
there will be circumstances where a supporting spouse should be reimbursed for the financial
contributions he or she made to the spouse's successful professional training." Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 495, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (1982). Reimbursement alimony is not the
same as rehabilitative alimony. Rehabilitative alimony is payable for a short but determinate
period of time and will cease when the recipient is, by the exercise of reasonable efforts, in a
position of self-support. Thus, rehabilitative alimony awards seek to assure that the party re-
questing alimony is able to meet his or her reasonable needs until appropriate employment is
obtained. It is unlikely that the nonstudent spouse of a career threshold divorce would qualify
for rehabilitative alimony since presumably she possessed the marketable skills necessary to
assume the position of breadwinner while her husband was in school. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23 § 501(c) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) describes the basis for awarding rehabilitative ali-
mony as follows:
(c) Unless the ability of the party seeking the alimony to provide for his or
her reasonable needs through employment is substantially diminished by reason
of age, physical, mental or emotional condition, custody of minor children, or
other compelling impediment to gainful employment, the court in ordering ali-
mony shall limit the duration of the order to a period of time which is reasonable
for the purpose of allowing the party seeking alimony to meet his or her reasona-
ble needs by:
(1) obtaining appropriate employment; or
(2) developing an appropriate employable skill.
For support of the proposition that alimony is rehabilitative except in unusual circumstances,
see Clark v. Clark, 45 Fayette 3 (1982). See generally Doyle v. Doyle, 5 Misc. 2d 4, 158
N.Y.S.2d 909 (1957) (Hofstadter, J.) (discussing the changing theories of alimony); Dixon &
Weitsman, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference? 14 FAM. L. Q.
141 (1980) (analyzing current trends of alimony awards).
157. Mahoney, 91 N.J. at 497, 453 A.2d at 536.
158. Id. at 495, 453 A.2d at 534.
that both parties will derive increased benefits can be a basis for
reimbursement alimony."5 9
Proponents of reimbursement alimony advocate the fairness of
such an award for past contributions to a spouse's education that
were made with the shared expectation of mutual economic benefit.
But reimbursement alimony is also subject to much criticism. First,
by limiting the availability of these awards to cases involving mutual
expectations, courts unjustifiedly limit the scope of what is essen-
tially a restitutional remedy. 1'0 Moreover, by insisting on proof of a
common marital plan of expected return, the courts openly invite the
student spouse's denial of such a plan."6 Finally recognition of in-
creased earning capacity as a marital asset will provide a better rem-
edy for thwarted expectations." 2
Alimony in any form is also inherently precarious because it
usually depends on the recipient's subsequent marital status. Section
501(e) of the Divorce Code specifically states that "[riemarriage of
the party receiving alimony shall terminate the award of ali-
mony."' 68 Other state legislatures"' and courts" 5 have established
similar conditions. It hardly seems equitable to allow the student
spouse to leave a marriage with all the fruits of an educational de-
gree without some remuneration to the spouse who bore many of the
burdens incident to procuring the degree simply because the nonstu-
dent spouse has elected to remarry. Yet under the present alimony
provisions any award couched in terms of reimbursement alimony
would be contingent upon the marital status of the recipient
spouse.' 6
159. Id., 453 A.2d at 534.
160. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (Measure of Restitution
Interest) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (Measure of Expectation
Interest).
161. See Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals:
How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 947, 948 n.4.
162. As in other contract actions, the nonstudent spouse, as injured party, should be
entitled to damages based on breach of expectation. Granting the nonstudent spouse a portion
of her ex-spouse's increased earning capacity would serve this purpose since reasonable estima-
tions could be made of the present worth of the right to practice a given vocation in a given
locality. The subject of the division would be the potential and not the future earnings per se.
The non-student spouse would then be entitled to receive a share proportionate to the contribu-
tions she made during the marriage. A purely restitutional remedy such as reimbursement
alimony is ineffective to treat frustrated expectations because it does not encompass any pro-
portional future gains.
163. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 501(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
164. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 510 (b) (Smith-Hurd 1983); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 248 (McKinney 1977).
165. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams 444 A.2d 977 (Maine 1982); Grove v. Grove, 280
Or. 341, 571 P.2d 477 (1977); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974);
Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 (1954) (all granting the court wide discretion
to terminate the alimony award for remarriage).
166. If the Pennsylvania courts adhere to their current preference of equity through
alimony, the alimony provisions of the Divorce Code, PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 501-502
(Purdon Supp. 1983-1984), will require revision. Most notably, § 501(e) will require an
An award of alimony under the current scheme, therefore, is
both inappropriate and inequitable when applied to career threshold
divorces because it forces the non-student spouse to forego remar-
riage in order to realize a return on her investment. 161 It is further
inadequate because a self-sufficient contributing spouse, especially in
career threshold divorces, may not be able to qualify.16 In addition,
since the monetary cost of the spouse's professional degree relates
only tangentially to the true value of the education, the restitution
remedy undercompensates the nonstudent spouse. 09
None of the nonmatrimonial equitable remedies 17 0 will likely be
available to the nonstudent spouse either. For example, if the sup-
porting spouse should choose to proceed under a constructive trust
theory, 17 1 she would have to prove that the student spouse was un-
justly enriched through breach of a confidential relation. 17 In other
contexts, the existence of a close family relationship does not per se
justify recognition of confidential relationship. 73 In the absence of
proof of a confidential relationship, the nonstudent spouse would
have to establish that the transfer of funds to the student spouse for
educational purposes was induced by fraud, duress, undue influence
of mistake.17 4 Moreover, even if the nonstudent spouse met these
burdens, the trust could attach to no specific res.'
7 5
amendment to permit a spouse receiving reimbursement alimony to remarry without fear of
termination of payments.
167. For an example of a proposed amendment that would rectify many of the inequities
currently faced by spouses seeking alimony in Pennsylvania after career threshold divorces, see
Kenderdine, Contributions to Spouse's Education. The Search For Compensation When the
Marriage Ends, 5 OKLA. CITY U. L. ReV. 409, 440-43 (1980).
168. See supra note 156.
169. Comment, Family Law: Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisible as Property
Upon Divorce?, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 517, 551 (1981) ("To the extent that the value of
an education exceeds its cost, the educated spouse at least partially becomes unjustly en-
riched." Id.).
170. For a through discussion of nonmatrimonial equitable remedies such as quantum
meruit and implied loan theories, see Erickson, Spousal Support Toward The Realization of
Education Goals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 947, 968-971;
Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV.
590, 592-595 (1974).
171. A "constructive trust" may be imposed where a person holding title to property is
subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the property may arise because
it was acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or through breach of a
fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition of another's property. The basis of the
constructive trust is the unjust enrichment which would result if the person having the prop-
erty were permitted to retain it. 5A ScoTT, LAW OF TeusTs 3215 (3d ed. 1967).
172. See. e.g., Stauffer v. Stauffer, 465 Pa. 558, 351 A.2d 236 (1976) (initial require-
ment of finding a confidential relationship for establishing a constructive trust).
173. Moreland v. Metrovich, 249 Pa. Super. 88, 375 A.2d 772 (1977) (sister to sister);
Paradise v. Paradise, 125 P.L.J. 20 (Pa. C.P., Allegheny County 1977) (husband to wife)
(constructive trust cases).
174. Moreland v. Metrovich, 249 Pa. Super. 88, 375 A.2d 772 (1977).
175. This last shortcoming would be outcome-determinative if the Pennsylvania courts
continue to refuse to recognize educational achievements as property. See, e.g., Millili v. Mil-
lili, 111 Montgomery 38, 39 (Pa. C.F. 1982) (quoting In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo.
The resultant lack of alternatives, then, together with the com-
pelling injustices of the present state of the law demand specific
changes in the methods of addressing the inequities of career thresh-
old divorces. In addition, the virtue of consistency in property divi-
sion theory" 6 mandates adoption of a property distribution remedy
based on a careful estimate of the present value of future earning
capacity.
V. Suggestions
Recognition of increased earning potential as a distributable
marital asset represents one approach to solving the current
problems inherent in career threshold divorces. Given the present in-
adequacies of alimony 177 and the evolving flexibility associated with
equitable distribution proceedings, 18 recognition of this asset might
be a panacea. This solution, however, is also subject to a number of
limitations. A primary constraint on assigning a present value to the
projected future earnings of the student spouse is that property must
be available in the marital kitty with which to compensate the non-
student spouse. Career threshold divorces typically involves dissolu-
tion of marriages with little or no tangible assets. In such cases, eq-
uitable dissolution could never reach fruition without a lien upon the
student spouse's future earnings. Perpetual liens, however, have been
severely criticized.
179
A second shortcoming of this remedy is section 523(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code 80 which includes alimony and child support
429, 431, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978)).
[A professional degree] does not have an exchange value or any objective
transferable value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates
on death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, trans-
ferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of
many years of previous education, combined with diligence and hard work. It
may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellec-
tual achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of prop-
erty. In our view, it has none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of
that term.
Thus, by refusing to recognize educational achievements as property the courts, in effect,
would foreclose the options of two remedies: constructive trusts and distribution as marital
property. See generally D. Doras, REMEDIES 242 (1973) (constructive trust impossible without
res or property to which trust might attach).
176. See supra notes 46-89 and accompanying text discussing "property" as a dynamic
concept.
177. See supra notes 151-169 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 21.
179. See Comment, A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution Pro-
ceedings, 56 WASH. L. REV. 277, 288 (1981).
180. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (1976 and Supp. 1984) provides in pertinent part
(a) A discharge under section 721, 1141 or 1328 (b) of this title [11 U.S.C.S. § 727,
1141, 04 1328(b)] does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt -
(5) to a spouse, former spouse ... for alimony to or maintenance for, or support of such
spouse . . . in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property
settlement...
among nondischargeable debts in bankruptcy. Marital property divi-
sions, however, may be discharged. Since federal law governs the
dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy, labels placed on awards by
state trial courts will offer little solace. 181 In consequence, any prop-
erty awards that involved a lien on increased earning capacity could
be discharged if the student spouse declared bankruptcy. 182 Still, de-
spite the drawbacks of recognizing increased earning capacity as a
marital asset, the inequities facing the nonstudent spouse remain
glaringly obvious.
The current alimony provisions of the Pennsylvania Divorce
Code' 83 offer little chance of resolving the existing injustices.
Amendments could, however, ensure that the nonstudent spouse's ex-
pectations are met. Rather than dressing the remedy in the garb of
restitution language, the new proposal should be called "expectancy
interest alimony"1s4 and should represent a fixed, lump sum, non-
modifiable award, payable, if necessary, out of future earnings, to
the nonstudent spouse. The amount awarded would be an equitable
share of the present value of the education based on predicted future
earnings and would not terminate upon the remarriage of the recipi-
ent spouse. Further, the award would not be predicated upon the
recipient's need or the obligor's immediate ability to pay.'85 The pro-
181. See In re Thomas, 21 B.R. 571 (Bank. 1982) (state tribunal's definitions of ali-
mony or property division for their own purposes do not foreclose federal interpretation of
what constitutes alimony or property division for purpose of nondischargeability); In re Lasher,
20 B.R. 543 (Bank. 1982) (definition of alimony will be determined under Bankruptcy law, not
state law).
182. See generally Branca, Dischargeability of Financial Obligations in Divorce: the
Support Obligation and the Division of Marital Property, 9 FAM. L.Q. 405 (1975); Hoffman
& Murray, Obligations that Cannot be Erased, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 18 (1983); Rendelman, The
Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C. L. REV. 723 (1980); Swann, Dis-
chargeability of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REV. 231 (1976); Tucker,
Treatment of Spousal and Support Obligations Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 45 TEx. B.J. 1359 (1982).
183. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). For a more com-
plete treatment of the current Pennsylvania alimony provisions, see J. RoUNICK, PA. MA-
TROMONIAL PRACTICE §§ 22-28 (1983); Gold-Bikin & Rounick, The New Pennsylvania Di-
vorce Code, 25 VILL L. REV. 617, 627-630 (1980).
184. The "expectancy interest alimony" would represent a return on the investment of
the nonstudent spouse in the education of the student spouse. Like any other investment, the
expectancy interest would be subject to gains or losses in market value. The gain realized as a
result of the attainment of a professional degree, however, is valuable to both partners only if
the marriage remains in tact. As a result, the career threshold divorce calls for a return on the
investment when the market value or potential for great returns is still high. In this way the
expectancy interest of the investor is appropriately recompensed. In marriages of longer dura-
tion where the contributing spouse has already recaptured some of the benefits from the in-
creased earning capacity, the award would be reduced since the market value of the expec-
tancy interest alimony would have declined, over the years, due to the decreased viability of
the aging student in the workforce.
185. Cf PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 501(a) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) which au-
thorizes a court to award alimony only if the party seeking alimony either lacks sufficient
property to provide for her needs or is unable to support herself through reasonable employ-
ment. Having demonstrated the ability to be self-supporting, the nonstudent spouse would fre-
quently be ineligible for alimony.
posal would somewhat resemble the "maintenance in gross" provi-
sions currently recognized in a few states. 186 Upon a final divorce
decree, these maintenance in gross awards become vested rights
which cannot be modified 187 or terminated upon remarriage or death.
An expectancy interest award would provide a viable remedy to as-
setless career threshold divorces since the student spouse could meet
his obligation through future earnings and not walk away from the
marriage unjustly enriched. Again, however, this remedy would call
for a lien on the student spouse's future income.
VI. Conclusion
Whether or not the Pennsylvania courts recognize increased
earning capacity as a marital asset in career threshold divorce cases
is not dispositive of the goal of achieving economic justice between
the parties. The suggested amendments to the current alimony provi-
sions of the Divorce Code offer an alternative approach to protecting
the expectancy interests of nonstudent marital investors. This com-
ment has attempted to show that a solid foundation of Pennsylvania
caselaw exists from which to construct either remedy.
Static notions of property law and exaggerated difficulties in
valuation simply rehash the antiquated rhetoric of a state whose di-
vorce laws, until 1980, had remained basically unchanged. 88 While
the Divorce Code enacted sweeping changes in Pennsylvania matri-
monial law, the enigma of career threshold divorce remains virtually
unaddressed. The current disposition in the Pennsylvania lower
courts against recognizing earning capacity as an asset subject to
equitable distribution 89 seems to set the stage for a legislative rather
than a judicial response. In any event, the time has certainly come to
close the curtain on the tragedy of career threshold divorces.
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186. See Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978); Magruder v. Ma-
gruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973).
187. PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 501(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984) presently per-
mits the modification of all maintenance awards.
188. J. ROUNICK, PENNSYLVANIA MATRIMONIAL PRACTICE § 1.1 (1982).
189. See supra note 41.
